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Abraham S. Goldsteint and Martin Marcus$
In December 1977, we published in this Journal the results of a
study we had made of Continental criminal procedure.' We noted that
in the face of a new concern in the United States for overly broad
prosecutorial discretion, a growing mistrust of plea bargaining, and a
continuing doubt of the effectiveness of exclusionary rules, American
commentators had begun to turn to so-called "inquisitorial" systems for
guidance. The literature then available in English described many of
these systems as operating without prosecutorial discretion or with dis-
cretion carefully controlled, functioning without guilty pleas, and pro-
viding a full pretrial judicial (or quasi-judicial) investigation for serious
cases. We were concerned that this literature might be misleading-that
it might have described only how the codes of criminal procedure
provided that these systems should operate, and not how they actually
do.2 We decided to explore these issues by interviewing prosecutors,
judges, defense attorneys, and scholars in France, Germany, and Italy.
In reporting the results of those interviews, we hoped to stimulate the
attitude of critical inquiry so crucial to any "borrowing" from the in-
stitutions of another country. We also wanted to encourage the develop-
ment of a more detailed body of knowledge of the operation of these
systems.
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1. A. Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) [hereinafter cited without
cross-reference as Myth of Judicial Supervision].
2. Professors Langbein and Weinreb chide us because we did not review the literature
written abroad. Langbein &- Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and
Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1567 & n.71 (1978) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as
Continental Criminal Procedure]. They overlook the fact that we relied heavily on the
writings of Langbein himself, which draw copiously on such literature, and on the
writings of other acknowledged authorities (e.g., Professors Damalka, Jescheck and Herr-
mann). All draw heavily on the foreign literature. Our objective was to present a com-
posite portrait of what had been communicated to Americans about those systems. In
addition, we interviewed in detail leading academic authorities in each of the countries
studied and, in order to get a sense of the law in operation, conducted extensive in-
terviews with judges, public prosecutors, and defense counsel. See Myth of Judicial
Supervision at 240 n.*, 246 n.17. It should be noted that Langbein and Weinreb give no
indication of the empirical basis for their many assertions about how French or German
law in fact operates. And the foreign literature they cite, Continental Criminal Procedure
at 1567 n.71, does not include any specific reference to empirical studies that address
problems of the sort we raise. We have not seen a copy of Dr. Weigend's bibliography, but
he was among the persons we interviewed in detail and whose generous assistance we
acknowledged, see Myth of Judicial Supervision at 240 n.*.
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From our interviews, we concluded that judges in "inquisitorial"
systems do not control or supervise the investigation, prosecution, or
trial of most criminal cases much more closely than do judges in our
own "adversarial" systems. We found that investigation was generally
left to the police and that-despite statutory prohibitions to the con-
trary-charging discretion was exercised frequently and without signif-
icant supervision by both police and prosecutor. Although plea bar-
gaining as such does not take place, we found analogous processes by
which prosecutor and defendant made similar accommodations through
"tacit understandings or patterns of reciprocal expectation." 3
In their response to our article, Professors Langbein and Weinreb
regrettably seem to be more committed to presenting a formalistic view
of European procedures than to communicating how such procedures
work and the extent to which they may deviate from formal require-
ments. Their appraisal of French and German procedure reflects little
of the skepticism about the relation between law on the books and law
in action that they undoubtedly would bring to bear in discussing
American criminal procedure. Seeing the seeds of domestic reform in
practices abroad, they ignore elements that might call some of those
reforms into question.4 In this respect, they may be even more bound
to formalism than many European observers. As happens all too often,
the acolytes may be more faithful than the priests.5
3. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 279.
4. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1550; see J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: GERMANY 1-2 (1977); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 11-12, 42-43, 117-46 (1977).
5. Professor Damalka comments:
There is a good and amusing book waiting to be written on this frequent peeking
over the fences of one's own national system into the legal garden of another, where
the grass frequently seems greener.... [I]t must be noted that much more empirical
research on various aspects of the judicial system has been carried out in America
than in other countries. Scholars from abroad, in describing their own system, quite
frequently talk about the normative design. Such normative accounts are sometimes
accompanied by more or less educated empirical guesses and very rarely by actual
empirical studies with a well-designed methodology. There is thus the danger that
Americans will compare their domestic realities with idealized descriptions of foreign
systems ....
M. Damalka, A Foreign Perspective on the American Judicial System (working paper for
conference on "State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future," held in Williamsburg, Va.,
March 19-22, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal); accord, W. Felstiner & A. Drew,
European Alternatives to Criminal Trials and Their Applicability in the United States 38
(Dec. 31, 1976) (National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Report)
("Perhaps it should come as no surprise that American critics see more hope in German
solutions than do German observers. In most reform efforts, the closer you are to the
details, the less sanguine you are about the effects.") Compare the Langbein and Weinreb
statement that we have presented "no evidence that the German rule of compulsory
prosecution is anything less than completely effective," Continental Criminal Procedure
at 1563, with the statement of Professor Herrmann, quoted by us in Myth of Judicial
Supervision at 282 n.95, that acknowledges the existence of "some examples of discre-
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Although Langbein and Weinreb assert that we have not fairly
described the operation of the French and German systems, they do not
challenge our central findings. For example, they concede that in
France cases are "correctionalized"-treated as delits though chargeable
as crimes-"in order not to burden the process" with unnecessary ju-
dicial investigations.6 They admit that "ordinary crimes" are routinely
investigated in France only by the police and that the prosecutor
usually relies on the evidence he receives from them.7 And they do not
contest our view that most French trials are perfunctory proceedings in
which " 'the key to the sufficiency of the evidence and accuracy of the
charge lies more in the dossier than in the trial itself.' "$ Similarly, they
do not challenge our contention that German criminal investigations
are dominated by the police,9 that uncontested trials are shorter than
contested ones, and that " '[i]f there is no apparent reason for the judge
to question a witness closely and if there is no encouragement from
counsel or the parties for him to do so, the result is a trial that is not
especially probing and is unlikely to stray far from the dossier.' "10
We were concerned that the failure of the American and English
literature on Continental criminal procedure to describe when and
what summary procedures were employed would mislead Americans
into believing that on the Continent summary procedures were some-
how not necessary. Langbein and Weinreb do not charge us so much
with inaccurately describing these procedures" as with mischaracter-
tionary power that are not expressly authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure" and
observes: "[i]t can be argued that the development of these exceptions indicates that the
German system works effectively only because of this unofficial police and prosecutorial
discretion." Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecu-
torial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 468, 505 (1974).
6. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1552.
7. Id. at 1553.
8. Id. at 1556 (quoting Myth of Judicial Supervision at 268).
9. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1559, 1564; accord, Kaiser, The Significance of
Empirical Research into the State Prosecutor's Office for Criminology and for Legal
Policy, in UNITED NATIONS ASIA AND FAR FAST INSTITUTE, REPORT FOR 1976 AND RESOURCE
MATERIAL SERIES No. 13, at 72, 81-82 (1977) (except for economic crime, investigations by
German State Prosecutors themselves are very unusual; prosecutor's evidence "is pre-
determined by and even dependent on the results of the police investigations").
10. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1566-67 (quoting Myth of Judicial Supervision
at 266) (footnote omitted). Compare Continental Criminal Procedure at 1562 n.50 (citing
study showing difference in duration of contested and uncontested trial is not sub-
stantial) with Myth of Judicial Supervision at 268 n.68 (criticizing methodology of study
and suggesting that difference in duration of contested and uncontested trials is greater
than indicated in study).
11. To some extent Langbein and Weinreb do charge us with inaccuracies, particularly
through omission. Most broadly, they say that we ignore significant differences between
the individual countries, a claim which is belied by the care we took to treat each country
separately in our descriptions. More particularly, they state that we have omitted mention
of the Zwischenverfahren, a German procedure for review of the sufficiency of the evidence
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izing them. They are troubled, for example, when we analogize French
"correctionalization" and the German penal order to American plea
bargaining and when we find in uncontested Continental trials striking
similarities to the taking of guilty pleas in the United States. They
assert that we measure these summary procedures (along with com-
parable Italian devices) against an unrealistic yardstick of judicial
supervision of the entire criminal process and that we unfairly suggest
that these common-sense shortcuts are either unlawful or improper
deviations from an "inquisitorial" norm.
Our point, however, was not to criticize summary procedures. 12 Like
Langbein and Weinreb, we realize that not all cases can or should
receive a thorough judicial investigation and trial. Our purpose was to
explain the ways in which Continental systems respond to problems
like those we face in the United States and the extent to which their
summary procedures may serve similar ends.13 Our critics resist this
by the trial judge before trial. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1562 n.51. We noted
the availability of this procedure but suggested that, as usually employed, it is ineffective.
Myth of Judicial Supervision at 261-62. Langbein and Weinreb also quarrel with a statistic
we cite from a study not published at the time our article appeared, indicating that, in
1970, 68% of all reported cases in Germany were terminated for lack of evidence. We
suggested that this figure pointed to "the exercise of some charging discretion by the
prosecutor." Id. at 275. Langbein and Veinreb note that "[t]he vast majority of the cases
not cleared were relatively less serious misdemeanors affecting unguarded property for
which it is difficult to obtain evidence." Continental Criminal Procedure at 1564. The
authors do not explain whether a case is "cleared" by a finding that although a particular
person committed the offense, it cannot be proven. Nor do they say what the "clearance"
rate is for the more serious offenses in which suspects are more likely to be identifiable.
In short, the statistics cited by Langbein and Weinreb also plainly indicate that some
charging discretion is exercised. The Max Planck Institute study, whose findings we
described, Myth of Judicial Supervision at 275-76, and which they curiously dismiss as
"unpublished and unofficial," Continental Criminal Procedure at 1564, confirms that such
discretion is exercised.
12. At many points in their response, Langbein and Weinreb assume that we were
critical of Continental practices that deviated from the Code. For example, they say that
we "strongly intimate that, at least at a theoretical level, the failure to conduct a judicial
investigation in most if not all [French] cases is improper and to be regretted," Con-
tinental Criminal Procedure at 1552 (footnote omitted). In discussing our observation
that investigations by the French police are usually conducted without supervision by the
prosecutor or examining magistrate and without subsequent judicial review, the authors
speak of our "apparent disapproval of French police practices," id. at 1555. We expressed
no approval or disapproval; we merely recognized the disparity between the law on
the books and the law in action. It should be noted that American scholars frequently
assume that the American s)stem deviates from its formal requirements. The writing on
European systems, however, reflects the contrary assumption that differences between
practices and formal requirements are bad and to be avoided. This attitude may explain
the reluctance to develop an empirical literature that searches for such differences.
13. Langbein and Weinreb apparently agree on the importance of knowing how these
summary procedures work. They say, for example, that "the question we ought to ask [is]
whether the procedure actually provided in France for the large number of delits [which
do not receive a judicial examination] is preferable to ours in comparable cases." Id. at
1553.
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analysis. They admit that the French prosecutor "correctionalizes"
cases to relieve the system of the obligation to conduct unnecessary
judicial examinations, but, paradoxically, they claim that "his decision
to do so does not evade a required procedure."'14 They assume that be-
cause French prosecutors and defendants do not explicitly bargain over
"correctionalization" or make other promises to exchange cooperation
for leniency, the "seriousness of the accusation [in France] does have
a bearing on the process of the prosecution," while in the United
States it does not.15 This assertion errs in both directions: French
"correctionalization" plainly allows factors other than the seriousness
of the charge to affect the mode of prosecution; just as plainly, the
seriousness of the charge in the United States is critically important
to the scope of any bargaining that takes place about the plea or
sentence.
The authors similarly resist the implications of their own observa-
tions about the German system. Though they assume as we do that not
all cases are fully investigated and that the decision of how fully to
investigate turns on the seriousness of the crime involved,' 6 they insist
nonetheless that there is no evidence that "the German rule of com-
pulsory prosecution is anything less than completely effective."'17 Of
course, police may investigate all crimes they know they can solve, and
prosecutors may prosecute all crimes for which they know there is sup-
porting evidence. But questions inevitably arise concerning when such
knowledge exists and how persistently such knowledge should be
sought; our evidence suggests that such subtleties are exploited.
Finally, Langbein and Weinreb deny that either the German penal
order or the summary trials in France or Germany can be compared to
a bargained plea of guilty. They assert-although there is evidence to
the contrary-that an accused who refuses to accept a German penal
14. Id. at 1552. Of course that procedure would be "required" if the offense were
treated as a crime, and is not "required," and therefore not "evaded," only because the
prosecutor decides to treat it as a delit. By saying, as they do, that "persons charged with
delits are not denied an investigation they ought to have had," id., Langbein and Weinreb
admit the utility of, and perhaps the need for, an extra-legal exercise of discretion.
15. Id. at 1557. According to Langbein and Weinreb, "it would startle all of those
involved, the accused not least, to suggest that he has given up something when he does
not insist on being prosecuted for a more serious offense." Id. American defendants who
plead guilty to reduced charges understand full well that they are "giving up something"
by not putting the prosecution to its proof on the higher charges. French defendants and
defense counsel, who glean from their experience a relationship between cooperation and
"correctionalization," understand as well.
16. In doing so, they discount entirely an empirical study whose findings of widespread
discretion exercised by police and prosecutor we reported. See note 11 supra (discussing
study by Max Planck Institute).
17. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1563.
1574
Vol. 87: 1570, 1978
Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure
order will not receive a higher sentence if convicted at trial,', and they
note that since "German trial procedure is relatively rapid, . . . the
prosecutor has no particular incentive to try to avoid trial even if he
could."' 9 One reason why trials are rapid is that in most of them
the accused does not contest his guilt.2 0 Langbein and Weinreb nowhere
deny that in both France and Germany such cooperation is appreciated
and rewarded. In general they assume that because there is no explicit
bargaining, face-to-face or otherwise, there are also no trade-offs and
compromises. Such an assumption simply mistakes the surface, and the
formal law, for the underlying reality.
The authors also maintain that we "dismiss as insignificant all the
differences in the selection, training, and professional codes" of police
and prosecutors, "as well as the institutional structure within which
they work." 2' We do not recognize, they say, that these officials can
be fairly said to serve "judicial" functions, that dossiers prepared by
the judicial police are something more than American police reports,
and that judgments made by Continental prosecutors-even when made
beyond the confines of the codes that regulate their conduct-are more
evenhanded than comparable decisions by their American counter-
parts. With this criticism, the authors reveal that at bottom they do not
rely on differences between "inquisitorial" and "adversarial" pro-
cedure but instead on the very point we affirm, that "[i]n the end these
Continental systems rely more on their ideology, and on the assump-
tion that officials adhere to the ideology, than on detailed judicial
supervision."22 Our prosecutors, like those in Continental systems, are
charged with the duty of uncovering exculpatory as well as inculpatory
18. Id. at 1565. But see H. BRUNS, STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHT 607 (2d ed. 1974) ("Zwar
werden die durch Strafbefehl ausgeworfenen Strafen im Falle fruchtlosen Einspruchs oft
erhbht; nach Seibert . . . scheint geradezu cin entsprechender (unzuliissiger) Gerichtsgc-
brauch dieser Art zu bcstehen, gegen den die Revisionsgerichte aber nicht eingreifen kn-
nen, sofern der Tatrichter nicht so unvorsichtig ist, die Tatsache des Einspruchs ausdriick-
lich als Strafschiirfungsgrund anzugeben .... .. " (translated thus: "In fact, penalties
stemming from the penal order are frequently increased in the case of a fruitless objection;
according to Seibert there seems almost to be a corresponding [unlawful] judicial practice
against which appellate courts cannot react so long as the trial judge is not careless enough
to explicitly mention the fact of the objection [to the penal order] as a ground for increas-
ing the severity of punishment .... ")); W. Felstiner & A. Drew, supra note 5, at 55-56
("[S]everal government officials, legal academics, and legal sociologists whom we inter-
viewed believe that defendants frequently bargained over penal orders. Their suspicions
are based on the high proportion of penal orders in white collar offenses; their observation
of cases where suspension of a driver's license is a possibility; and the implication in Dass's
Handbook for Lawyers, a widely-used practical text, that discussion of a penal order can
be initiated by a defendant's lawyer.")
19. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1562.
20. See note 10 supra.
21. Continental Criminal Procedure at 1550.
22. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 283.
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evidence. Our police, like theirs, are bound by law23 and face disci-
plinary proceedings and civil and criminal penalties when they violate
it.24 Naked assertions that Continental officials are more committed
ideologically or institutionally to the rule of law do not advance the
debate on the merits of borrowing inquisitorial procedures..2 5
We are not hostile to the redefinition of the judicial role in the
American system. Indeed, one of us wrote earlier that in the United
States
we are held captive by models built on the adversary trial. Yet it
makes little sense to carry the idea of a reactive judge in an ad-
versary trial to the quite different context of the judge who must
supervise administrative processes. Adversary processes and accusa-
torial premises may be inapplicable to a system which has changed
its shape and which increasingly casts the judge in a proactive role.
We might better be served by practices drawn from inquisitorial
systems, in which judges are routinely assigned tasks which are ad-
ministrative and supervisory.
20
We looked to Continental criminal procedure precisely because it is
there that a more active and effective judicial role is claimed. But our
findings suggest the need to learn the limits of what judges and other
23. As Langbein and Weinreb say of the German police forces, Continental Criminal
Procedure at 1560, so might it be said of many of ours, particularly in large cities or at
the federal level: they "are relatively large; they are organized or coordinated" in a
hierarchical manner, "and they have many grades of rank and compensation." '"[Merito-
cratic promotion policies" that give the police "a direct incentive to avoid generating
citizen complaints" are also to be found in our system. Such generalizations, of course, tell
us very little about actual law enforcement in particular jurisdictions.
24. It does not prove much to describe a single instance of the prosecution seventeen
years ago of a police official for abusing a suspect during interrogation. See Continental
Criminal Procedure at 1560 (discussing case of Otto N ). Occasional examples of suc-
cessful civil and criminal proceedings against American police officers could be cited as
well. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 449-51 (1978) (citing
civil and criminal cases and criticizing their effectiveness as deterrent).
25. We found that the French authorities are reluctant to invoke another technique
for remedying police misconduct, the "nullification" of illegal investigatory acts by striking
the evidence so produced from the dossier. Commenting on our observation, Langbein and
Weinreb assert that "the exclusion of evidence is not applied as a remedy for police mis-
conduct in France as it is here," Continental Criminal Procedure at 1554. We were not,
as the authors suggest, charging the French system with failing to adopt the full range of
exclusionary rules applicable in this country but simply reporting that French judges
charged with supervising investigations and conducting trials do not enforce the "nulli-
fication" provisions of the code. See Myth of Judicial SuPervision at 254-55. The issue is
not one of judicial creation of a remedy through the exclusionary rule, but of judicial
failure to apply the statutory remedy of nullification.
26. A. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1024 (1974).
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officials can do and to assess the risk that judicial control may drive
decisions into hiding in the inevitable cracks among the provisions of
a code of criminal procedure. We reported our findings not to end an
interesting and potentially important debate, but instead to develop it
further by encouraging the analysis of issues and the production of
empirical evidence that might separate myth from reality. The re-
sponse by Professors Langbein and Weinreb suggests that the myths
persist and continue to intrude in appraising the significance of
European procedures for American criminal justice.
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